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History has shown that inaccurate assessments of 
credibility can result in tremendous costs to businesses 
and society. This study uses Signal Detection Theory 
(SDT) to improve the accuracy of credibility assessments 
through combining automated and participatory decision 
support. Participatory decision support is also proposed to 
encourage acceptance of the decision aid’s 
recommendation. A new hybrid decision aid is designed 
to perform automated linguistic analysis and elicit and 
analyze perceptual cues (i.e., indirect cues) from an 
observer. The results suggest that decision aids that 
collect both linguistic and indirect cues perform better 
than decision aids that collect only one type of cue. Users 
of systems that collect linguistic cues experience 
improved credibility assessment accuracy; yet, users of 
systems that collect both types of cues or only indirect 
cues do not experience higher accuracy. However, 
collecting indirect cues increases the user’s acceptance of 
decision-aid recommendations.  
Keywords 
Credibility Assessment, Signal Detection Theory, 
Linguistic Analysis, Indirect Cues Elicitation, Decision 
Support Systems 
INTRODUCTION 
Credibility is very difficult for people to assess correctly 
in face-to-face (FtF) interactions (Bond and DePaulo, 
2006). Yet, it is a critical capability that is foundational to 
effective communication and decision making. Credibility 
is the believability of a source due to message recipients’ 
perceptions of the source’s trustworthiness and expertise 
(Metzger et al., 2003). Credibility is influenced by 
receiver characteristics, source characteristics, message 
characteristics, and cognitive-processing routes (Chaiken 
and Maheswaran, 1994). Estimates of others’ level of 
credibility are often misplaced.  Therefore, the primary 
goal of assessing credibility is ensuring credibility is 
properly attributed—meaning credibility is given when a 
source’s message is true and accurate.  
Despite the importance of accurate credibility assessment, 
research has repeatedly shown that most people are overly 
trusting when evaluating incoming messages (Levine et 
al., 1999). A recent meta-analysis investigating human-
assessment ability demonstrated that when people are 
faced with equal numbers of truthful or deceptive 
messages, they could distinguish truthful messages from 
deceptive ones at an accuracy rate of 54%, only 
marginally better than chance (Bond and DePaulo, 2006). 
To help address this issue, several researchers have tried 
to improve credibility assessments by using decision aids. 
Recently, research has investigated new unobtrusive 
methods of assessing credibility (Jensen et al., in press). 
These credibility assessments rely on observable 
behaviors to detect many cues that are normally difficult 
for humans to detect. Examples of such aids include 
automated language processing and analysis tools (Zhou 
et al., 2004a). Recommendations produced by these 
decision aids typically fall between 70% and 80% 
accuracy (Zhou et al., 2004b). 
There are two limitations to unobtrusive decision aids: (1) 
users often do not accept a decision aid’s 
recommendation, despite the aid’s potential to improve 
the users’ accuracy; and (2) diagnostic, perceptual 
measures of credibility have not been incorporated into 
the decision aid. Perceptual measures have been shown to 
improve credibility assessment accuracy (Vrij et al., 2001, 
Vrij et al., 2004). However, these measures are currently 
identifiable only by humans and thus have received little 
attention in designing decision aids. To address these 
issues, this study uses Signal Detection Theory (SDT) to 
design a hybrid expert system that both analyzes the 
structure and content of messages (i.e., direct, linguistic 
cues) and elicits perceptual information from an 
interaction observer (i.e., indirect cues).  
BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
Humans face a number of difficulties when attempting to 
assess the credibility of a source. First, in making 
assessments, people tend to rely on behaviors that are not 
diagnostic of deception (The Global Deception Research 
Team, 2006). Further, people typically adopt a heuristic-
based approach for judging credibility. This phenomenon 
is termed truth bias (McCornack and Parks, 1986). While 
such heuristic labeling is done rapidly, it frequently 
undermines one’s ability to detect possible deception. 
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Finally, people are limited in their information processing 
capabilities (Newell and Simon, 1972). Their typical 
focus on small subsets of non-diagnostic cues and the 
manifestation of biases are symptoms of these limitations.  
Despite the difficulty with credibility assessment, there is 
reason to believe that humans can effectively contribute to 
a human-computer system of credibility assessment. 
Perceptual measures are among the strongest cues to 
deception (DePaulo et al., 2003) and humans are uniquely 
capable of evaluating them. Such perceptual cues are 
generated by manual behavioral coding where trained 
coders observe an interaction and record perceptions 
about what they observed. These perceptual cues are 
difficult to automatically approximate because they 
represent global assessments of a whole interaction, span 
multiple channels, and require semantic understanding of 
verbal messages. Building on the success of behavior 
coders’ ability to identify cues highly correlated with 
truthful and deceptive messages, Vrij et al. developed and 
successfully tested methods for rapidly eliciting 
information from interaction observers (Vrij et al., 2001, 
Vrij et al., 2004). They term this elicitation the collection 
of “indirect cues” and hypothesize that assessing 
credibility via more indirect means would result in higher 
assessment accuracy. 
Computer-Based Assessment Capabilities 
A recent thrust in credibility assessment research has been 
the development of new, unobtrusive assessment methods 
based on observable behavior. These new methods are a 
significant departure from past attempts at machine-aided 
credibility assessment, which attempts have consistently 
targeted physiological indicators of stress and arousal. 
One area that has received attention during the 
development of unobtrusive credibility assessment 
decision aids is automated language processing and 
analysis (Zhou et al., 2004a). In most interactions, 
language is the mechanism through which deceptive 
messages are sent and received. Researchers have long 
sought to identify cues deceivers exhibit or strategies they 
use so that, when present, deception can be identified. A 
few manual credibility assessment methods have been 
developed as a result, but these methods all require 
trained reviewers to meticulously examine suspected 
statements for extended periods of time (Vrij, 2000).  
There have been various attempts to construct computer-
based decision aids to capture and analyze message 
characteristics and present recommendations concerning 
the credibility of the message (e.g., Zhou et al., 2004b). 
These aids have attempted to approximate manual 
credibility assessment methods in an automated setting 
and generally focus on categories of credibility cues such 
as passive voice, self-reference, negative statements, 
generalizations, uncertainties, temporal details, spatial 
details, and affective details (Zhou et al., 2004a). In 
contrast to more gestalt indirect cues, linguistic cues are 
very granular in nature (e.g., means and ratios of parts of 
speech) and require significant processing capability to 
monitor. Decision aids that utilize linguistic cues have 
consistently exceeded the assessment capabilities 
typically seen among unaided observers (e.g., Zhou et al., 
2004b) and can significantly extend the capabilities of 
users.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
SDT is applied in scenarios where an individual (or 
group) is given a sensory stimulus and tries to discern 
signal from noise in the stimulus. SDT recognizes that 
individuals may have a difficult time discerning between 
a signal (e.g., deception) and noise (e.g., non-deception) 
that are present simultaneously in judgment tasks. SDT 
asserts that in every detection scenario  two measurable 
and separate elements exist that allow individuals to 
discriminate between signals and noise: (1) the criterion 
used to make the decision as to whether a stimulus is 
signal or noise, and (2) sensitivity to the sensory stimulus 
(Green and Swets, 1966, Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999).  
A key component of SDT is that individuals have a 
decision variable by which they determine whether a 
signal exists. Applied to our context, this decision 
variable would be something akin to suspicion. Each 
assessor would have a threshold for the decision variable, 
which, if exceeded, would indicate that deception is 
present. Clearly, the decision variable that is used, how it 
is measured, and the criterion that is used are perceptual 
and subjective.  
SDT also proposes two mechanisms whereby decisions 
may be improved and it is by these mechanisms that 
credibility assessment may be enhanced by a decision aid. 
The first mechanism proposed by SDT to improve 
decisions is to create more separation between the signal 
distribution and the noise distribution. In our context, this 
is accomplished by basing the decision variable on more 
diagnostic cues or features. For this understanding, we 
must turn to research on deception and credibility. No 
characteristic or cue is completely diagnostic and reliable, 
but some are more diagnostic and reliable than others. 
Separation between the signal and noise distributions is 
accomplished by increasing the diagnostic ability of 
existing features or increasing the number of cues that 
provide unique diagnostic ability. 
The second is proper placement of the criterion. It is 
through the placement of the criterion that biases become 
evident and this is especially pertinent in credibility 
assessment where people are generally disposed to 
characterize the messages that they receive as truth. A 
conservative criterion, prevents actual deceptive messages 
from being classified as deception even though the 
receiver has some level of suspicion. Proper placement of 
the criterion is accomplished by examining past values of 
the decision variable for occurrences of known deception 
and truth and then setting the criterion so that false 
negatives and false positives are minimized.  
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In this study, we use a decision aid to perform a linguistic 
analysis to extract cues directly from messages. Linguistic 
analyses have been shown to provide diagnostic cues of 
deception. In addition, the decision aid used in this study 
solicits from users and processes indirect cues based on 
observed behaviors. Past research has found these 
perceptual measures to also be diagnostic indicators of 
credibility. Further, the decision aid is able to properly 
establish its decision criterion to maximize its overall 
assessment accuracy based on noise and signal 
distributions of the decision variable.  
H1: A decision aid using both linguistic analysis and indirect 
cue elicitation will produce recommendations that will be more 
accurate than the judgments of an unaided observer. 
 
While the direct and indirect cues the decision aid uses 
have been shown to be diagnostic, they are collected at 
different levels (granular vs. gestalt) and draw on 
differing characteristics. The direct cues are extracted 
solely from the message itself; however, indirect cues 
may consider not only the message but also the 
characteristics of the message source. Thus, 
H2: A decision aid using both linguistic analysis and indirect 
cue elicitation will produce more accurate recommendations 
than a decision aid using only one of these components. 
 
Decision aids that produce recommendations based on 
direct cues utilize theoretically sound, diagnostic cues of 
credibility to augment the cognitive capacity of users. 
With automated analysis of linguistic cues, the decision 
aid can automatically extract and analyze diagnostic cues 
in an unbiased fashion. Unaided credibility assessors 
would not have the cognitive capacity to track these 
diagnostic cues in real time, let alone analyze them in an 
unbiased fashion.  
H3: Use of the decision aid implementing linguistic analysis will 
improve an observer’s assessment accuracy. 
 
Unique to this study is the implementation of indirect cue 
elicitation in a decision aid. Although the danger exists 
that observers will perpetuate their biases and suspicions 
through their indirect cues scoring, indirect cue elicitation 
appears to be a valid method to collect diagnostic, 
perceptual measures from interaction observers. This is in 
contrast with unaided assessment, where observers are left 
to determine for themselves the linkage between observed 
cues and the level of credibility. A decision aid can elicit 
diagnostic, indirect cues based on perceptions of source 
and message cues, reliably evaluate the cues, and present 
the user with an interpretable recommendation.  
H4: Use of the decision aid implementing indirect cue elicitation 
will improve an observer’s assessment accuracy. 
 
Building on previous hypotheses, using both types of cues 
should provide the most accurate recommendations. The 
recommendations produced by this aid should positively 
influence the user’s assessment accuracy the most.  
H5: Use of the decision aid that implements linguistic analysis 
and indirect cue elicitation will improve an observer’s 
assessment accuracy more than use of an aid implementing only 
one component. 
 
Although the automated analysis of direct cues is 
anticipated to increase accuracy by augmenting the user, 
the increase in accuracy may be partially negated due to a 
reluctance to accept the decision aid’s recommendation. 
This has been a significant area of concern noted in past 
research on aided credibility assessment (Jensen et al., 
2009). In answer to this concern, we posit that an 
additional benefit provided by participatory computer-
aided credibility assessment is an increased likelihood 
that the recommendation will be accepted by the user. The 
method of collecting direct, linguistic cues is fully 
automated and does not require user oversight or allow 
evaluation. In contrast, the users have a very active, 
participatory role in providing indirect cues.  The users 
understand where the indirect cues came from and have a 
basis for evaluating the cues and, by extension, the 
recommendation based on the cues. They may also feel 
some ownership in the recommendations as they were 
source of the cues. Therefore,   
H6: Users will accept the recommendation of the decision aid 
more frequently when the aid contains the indirect cue 
elicitation component. 
METHOD 
A controlled laboratory experiment was conducted to test 
the hypotheses. Upon arriving at the lab, participants were 
seated at a computer and randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions: Unaided, indirect cues only (IDC-only), 
linguistic analysis only (LA-only), and both indirect cues 
and linguistic analysis (IDC-LA). The IDC-LA condition 
tests the full functionality of the human-computer 
assessment system. Each participant viewed an 
orientation video that provided a brief description of the 
decision aid and reported accuracy rates of past validation 
efforts of linguistic analysis. Following the orientation, 
the participants viewed 10 randomly ordered interactions. 
After viewing an interviewee, the participant had access 
to the decision aid (if applicable) and then provided a 
credibility assessment consisting of a judgment (guilty or 
not guilty of cheating), level of deception, and level of 
confidence).  
The experiment involved 167 participants recruited from 
an upper-division business course at a large southwestern 
university. The mean age of the participants included in 
this study was 21.4, mean years of secondary education 
were 3.3, and of all the participants, 45% were female and 
55% were male. The stimulus materials for this study 
came from a previous experiment that collected high-
stakes, unsanctioned deceptive and truthful interactions 
during an interview (Levine et al., 2006).  
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ANALYSIS 
The mean raw accuracy rates of the decision aid, unaided 
users, and the number of participants who contributed 
indirect cues are shown in Table 1. Using message-feature 
mining, the LA-only aid correctly characterized six out of 
the ten interviews and all participants viewed the same ten 
interviews. Therefore, the raw accuracy of 
recommendations produced by the LA-only decision aid 




Overall Accuracy of Aid 
Recommendation (SD) [%] 
Hit Rate (SD) 
[%] 
False Alarm 
Rate (SD) [%] 
Unaided
a
 41 51.7 (11.6) 26.3 (9.2) 24.6 (9.5) 
LA-onlyb  60.0 30.0 20.0 
IDC-only 43 48.1 (13.0) 26.5 (10.2) 28.4 (10.0) 
IDC-LA 42 62.4 (4.8) 32.1 (4.7) 19.8 (4.7) 
 
 
Table 1. Accuracy rates of the decision aid 
To compare the accuracy rates of the conditions, three t-
tests were performed. To control for inflated type-I error, 
a Bonferroni correction for repeated tests was adopted. 
First, the accuracy rate of the human-computer system 
was compared to the accuracy rate of individuals in the 
unaided condition. In support of H1, the IDC-LA 
condition produced a recommendation accuracy rate that 
was significantly higher that the accuracy rate of unaided 
individuals (t(81) = 5.49, p < .001). To test if the IDC-LA 
aid exceeded the performance of the LA-only aid, a one-
sample t-test was performed with 60% as the value of 
comparison. The accuracy rate of recommendations in the 
IDC-LA condition exceeded the LA-only condition (t(41) = 
3.186, p = .003). The accuracy rate of the 
recommendations in the IDC-LA condition exceeded 
accuracy rate in the IDC-only condition (t(83) = 6.68, p < 
.001), supporting H1.  
Hypotheses 3–5 test users’ assessment accuracy when 
using the different versions of the decision aid. To test 
H3, a two-way Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was 
performed with IDC use and LA use as independent 
variables and accuracy as the dependent variable. No 
assumptions of parametric statistical tests were violated in 
this test. Covariates included years of secondary 
education, gender, and age. However, none of the 
covariates exerted a significant influence on assessment 
accuracy. Therefore, the model was reformulated to a 
standard two-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and 
excluded the covariates. The raw accuracy rates are 
shown in Table 2. The users in the LA-only condition 
demonstrated improvement in assessment accuracy 
(F(1,163) = 7.112, p = .008). This finding supports H3. In 
contrast, there was no significant effect on accuracy for 
users in the IDC-Only condition, and the interaction effect 
of IDCxLA was not significant. These findings fail to 




Overall Accuracy of Aid 
Recommendation (SD) [%] 
Hit Rate (SD) 
[%] 
False Alarm 
Rate (SD) [%] 
Unaideda 41 51.7  (11.6) 26.3 (9.2) 24.6 (9.5) 
LA-onlyb 41 55.1  (14.0) 28.3 (9.5) 23.2 (9.9) 
IDC-only 43 47.7  (13.4) 23.7 (9.5) 26.0 (10.0) 
IDC-LA 42 55.2  (13.5) 28.8 (9.9) 23.6 (9.6) 
 
 
Table 2. Accuracy rates of the decision aid users. 
The acceptance of the decision aid’s recommendation was 
tested via a one-way ANCOVA with IDC use as the 
independent variable and percentage of agreement as the 
dependent variable. Again, parametric testing 
assumptions were not violated and years of secondary 
education, gender, and age were included in the model as 
covariates. The versions of the decision aid that elicited 
indirect cues from the user had a greater number of 
recommendations accepted (F(1,121) = 13.49, p < .001). 
Interestingly, younger participants seemed more likely to 
accept the recommendations of the decision aid (F(1,121) = 
3.15, p = .078). 
DISCUSSION 
The results suggest that a system becomes more 
diagnostic when both indirect cue elicitation and 
linguistic analysis are instantiated in the decision aid. The 
decision aid is more diagnostic with both components 
than when it has only one component (H2) and the 
performance of the decision aid exceeds that of the 
unaided observer (H1). However, only the users of the 
decision aid employing direct, linguistic cues showed a 
significant improvement over unaided users (H3). The 
elicitation of indirect cues alone did not improve accuracy 
(H4). Further, the users who were using the decision aid 
instantiating both linguistic analysis and indirect cue 
elicitation did not demonstrate a corresponding 
improvement in accuracy (H5). However, elicitation of 
indirect cues did encourage more acceptance of the 
decision aid’s recommendations (H6). Thus, the accuracy 
of the decision aid improved through the consideration of 
direct and indirect cues, but that accuracy improvement 
did not transfer sufficiently to the users of the aid—the 
ones who are ultimately responsible for assessment. 
Our contrary finding of H4 merits additional discussion. 
Our work exposes a potentially dangerous scenario where 
users are accepting the recommendations of a decision aid 
where the decision aid’s recommendations are not 
improving their assessment accuracy. The reasons for the 
users’ poor performance in utilizing indirect cues may 
stem from the following: deficiencies in the user and 
deficiencies in the system. Both potential deficiencies are 
discussed below. 
The first possible explanation behind indirect cue failure 
is that the questions eliciting the indirect cues were 
somehow faulty or not diagnostic. This conclusion 
contradicts what has been shown in past research: 
complexity, engagement, plausibility, uncertainty, 
cooperativeness, anxiety, and affect have all been shown 
to be highly diagnostic across varying conditions.  
The users may not have found the recommendation very 
helpful, indicating weakness in the interface design or of 
the content layout. However, this explanation for the poor 
performance is difficult to support because the 
recommendations were accepted by the users in the large 
majority of judgments.  
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There are a number of explanations for the poor 
performance of the IDC-only condition that stem from the 
user. First, the users may not have properly understood 
the questions eliciting the indirect cues. This is likely, 
given that there is wide variation in indirect cue scores for 
the same interviewee. This variation indicates potential 
reliability problems with participants’ understanding of 
the questions and it is problematic because the variation 
in question responses results in variation in the decision 
aid’s recommendation. The provision of explanations was 
an attempt at attenuating this effect by encouraging 
common definitions of key terms during elicitation. 
However, those in the IDC conditions did not view more 
explanations than the users in the LA-only condition.  
An additional difficulty that the users faced was 
separating their judgments from the indirect cues that they 
observed. This problem was observed during the selection 
and pilot testing of the indirect cue items where 
participants would make an assessment and then ensure 
that all of their responses to the indirect cue questions 
matched their assessment. It may be unreasonable to 
expect that observers are capable of scoring indirect cues 
in an unbiased balanced fashion, when they must also 
provide a veracity judgment of what they observe.  
Finally, the observers may not have appreciated the 
difficulty and level of effort required to properly assess 
credibility. As mentioned previously, observers easily fall 
into the trap of heuristic-based assessment techniques 
(e.g., decision rules such as “believe everyone”). 
However, such decision rules may be more complex and 
involve the cues than were elicited by the decision aid. 
Thus, the simple decision rules the users had may have 
been supplanted by other simple decision rules suggested 
by the decision aid.  
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